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This study examines rituals of outspokenness, by analysing cases drawn from the US 
hidden camera show, Primetime: What Would You Do? Studying ritualistic behaviour 
in cases when bystanders become side participants as they stand up for victims of 
abuse fills a knowledge gap in pragmatics. A further merit of studying this 
phenomenon is that it provides insight into the reactive aspect of ritual behaviour, 
which is usually described in the field as a form of action rather than reaction. 
Furthermore, the morally loaded acts of rituals of outspokenness reveals the 
potentially complex relationship between aggression and normative behaviour. 
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1. Introduction
The present study examines ‘rituals of outspokenness’ within episodes of intervention
in  a  reality  television  programme.  Ritual  is  a  recurrent  (and  thus  expected)
performance, which (re-)enacts the normative beliefs/values of a relational network or
a  broader  social  group.  For  example,  singing  a  national  anthem,  conferring  an
honorary title, and announcing a verdict in public are all ritual acts because they re-
enact certain social values in dramatic ways. However, the category of ritual is not
limited  to  such  formalised  acts:  often  we  interactionally  co-construct  rituals  that
belong to narrower relational networks of people. For example, retelling an ‘old joke’
can operate as an in-group ritual that re-enacts interpersonal values (friendship) within
a relational network as a performance. In a similar way, ostracising a person through
the recurrent performance of ignoring them – e.g. by not responding to their questions
and ignoring their other contact attempts – can become an abusive interactionally co-
constructed form of ritual behaviour, a performance that animates a group’s belief that
the  ostracised  person  is  unwanted  (see  Kádár 2013  on  the  interactional  co-
construction of rituals). 
In the context of intervention, the notion ‘ritual of outspokenness’ refers to the
recurrent  and expected dramatic  action of stepping up against  the committer  –  or
group of committers – of a seemingly immoral  action.2 In terms of ‘footing’ (see
1. Corresponding author’s e-mail address: d.z.kadar@hud.ac.uk . Dániel Kádár would like to 
say a big thank you to the following colleagues: Francesca Bargiela-Chiappini, Jonathan 
Culpeper, and Rosina Marquez-Reiter. He would also like to extend his gratitude to Jacob 
Mey for drawing his attention to the ‘Kitty Genovese’ case. The authors feel indebted to the 
anonymous referees for their constructive and most insightful comments. It is perhaps 
needless to say that all remaining errors belong to us. 
2. It is pertinent to note at this point that rituals of outspokenness also exist in non-
interventional contexts, e.g. when a person is being ostracized (see below and also Kádár 
2013).
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Goffman 1979),  a  ritual  of outspokenness transforms a ‘bystander’ (or a group of
bystanders),  who is  unratified to participate,  into ratified “side participant(s)” (see
Kádár and Haugh 2013: 89). A ritual of outspokenness thus reinforces situated moral
expectations (Boltanski and Thévenot 2000), and it counts as a dramatic action that
attempts to restore the normative order of appropriate/socially acceptable behaviour.
Consequently, bystanders and observers of a setting when someone is abused tend to
expect (or, at least,  wish) that this ritual action will take place (from a participant
perspective: ‘wish that someone had the courage to put the bully back in his proper
place’). Public awareness of someone’s failure to (at least to attempt to) be outspoken
and challenge an immoral act of abuse in some way – when they had a chance to do
so – occasions shame (as shown in Section 3.2). This ritual is normative also in the
sense that it requires common ground – triggered by the bystanders’ empathy with the
victim (see Mey 2008)3 – to be set into motion: without sharing common ground with
the victim there are no rights or duties for a bystander to change their footing (see
example 9). A typical ritual of outspokenness in the present data (discussed in Section
2) is represented by example (1):
(1)
Retrieved from Primetime: What Would You Do? (see Section 2)
Lesbian parents verbally abused 
Lesbian couple eating breakfast with their two kids at a restaurant in Texas. 
The server berates and humiliates the lesbian couple. Several customers 
overhear the server. 
1. Server: You’re gay and you have kids? It’s bad enough that you are 
lesbians but that they don’t have a father [pause] I think that is kind of 
bad. You don’t feel uncomfortable – people watching you? Isn’t it bad 
for the kids? I think it’s terrible!
2. [Lesbian couple does not answer and looks embarrassed.]
 3.     Young male: Sorry, but you are just being rude. It’s completely 
inappropriate when someone comes into a restaurant to have breakfast 
with their family that you question their life choices.
4. Server: I just think I am entitled to my own opinion. 
5. Young male: You are entitled to your opinion but this is not the place to
voice your opinion.
6. Server: Is it just me that’s upset? [looks in different direction in the 
restaurant]
7. Middle aged female: That doesn’t bother me at all.
8. Server: [to the lesbian couple] You don’t think it’s bad for the kids that 
they don’t have a dad? I think you guys should just leave. You are 
disturbing everybody else!
9.   Young male: You are by far the worst waitress I have ever seen in this 
restaurant. Ever! You are a horrible person and a horrible waitress. 
Like, you need to leave. You need to physically leave this restaurant!
This interaction represents a row between a server who verbally abuses4 a lesbian
couple and two customers who stand up and defend the couple. The clash takes place
3. See also Heritage and Lindström (2012) on the topic of common ground and empathy. 
Dániel Kádár is grateful to Jacob Mey for drawing his attention to this article. 
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after the customers see that the parents, who are openly humiliated by the server’s
verbally aggressive behaviour, do not respond to the insulting comments (line 2). The
young male immediately challenges  and criticises the server,  and when the server
argues back, he engages in a conflictual verbal interaction with her. In line 7, he is
supported by another customer, a woman who – in response to the server’s query –
argues that the presence of the couple does not bother her. Ritual as we can observe
here is not formalised but rather interactionally co-constructed; however, the young
intervening male’s behaviour should be seen as ritualistic as a) he (re-)animates public
opinion several times in the conversation (through the general metacomment “[i]t’s
completely  inappropriate  to…” he  refers  to  social  values  rather  than  his  personal
judgement), b) he takes up the role of authority figure in a social drama (e.g. “You
need to physically leave this restaurant!”), and c) his behaviour is expected (another
customer feels encouraged to join in). 
As this example shows, as rituals of outspokenness tend to take place when
someone is/seems to be unable to defend him or herself, the victim has little active
role in these interactions, and it is thus not surprising that in our data there are very
few utterances produced by the victim. The normativity of the ritual of outspokenness
is shown in Figure 1 (see Section 2): in the data studied, a notably large number of
bystanders  intervened  in  some  form  when  someone  was  victimised  in  public.
Furthermore, as Section 3.2 illustrates, interactional contexts of public abuse trigger
awareness that not performing a ritual of outspokenness is regarded as improper. 
1.1. Scholarly importance
The  study  of  rituals  of  outspokenness  has  different  merits  for  the  analyst.  First,
research  of  this  understudied  phenomenon  fills  a  knowledge  gap  in  pragmatics.
Although interpersonal verbal conflict has an extensive literature (see e.g. Hayashi
1996;  Holmes  and  Marra  2004;  Graham 2007;  Culpeper  2011),  and  so  does  the
pragmatics of empathy (see e.g. Takahashi and Beebe 1987; Wynn and Wynn 2006;
Mey 2008; Burdelski 2013), this particular morally-loaded empathic ritual conflict
had received little attention, despite the fact that studying this phenomenon enriches
understandings of the dynamics of the interactional relationship between participants
and bystanders. The phenomenon of outspokenness has, in fact, been studied in social
psychological  and  linguistic  inquiries  into  ostracism,  as  one  of  the  ‘strategies’
(Sommer and Yoon 2013) for upholding relational, cultural or group norms. However,
ostractism via outspokenness represents a case when members of a relational network
reinforce in-group relationships by forcing a deviant member to obey interpersonal
norms and contribute to the collective (see e.g. Marques 1990; Marques and Paez
1994;  Dijker  et  al.  2007).  Thus,  such  manifestations  of  ostracism  operate  with
relational history, and they are situated in a series of events; consequently, as social
psychologists Williams & Sommer (1997), and Williams & Zadro (2001) argue, these
acts tend to have a punitive nature.5 Although ostracising is an important type of ritual
of outspokenness, this ritual has another, less-known, out-group type, and the present
paper examines rituals of outspokenness by focusing on this latter, one-off type event.
These  one-off  ritual  events  are,  in  a  sense,  more  ad  hoc  than  their  in-group
4. Note also that WWYD represents non-violent conflict; arguably, it is more difficult to 
intervene in acts of violence, e.g. when the abusing person is holding a weapon.
5. There are constructive and destructive rituals of ostracising outspokenness, the latter 
involving cases when bullies ‘let the victim know their opinion’ about her or him, that is, 
when ostracism does not serve the constructive goal of reintegrating a deviant group member.
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counterparts, which tend to follow the situated practices of a relational network (see
Kádár 2013).
Second, rituals of outspokenness are noteworthy as they represent a complex
interpersonal  situation;  this  complexity  may  explain  why  these  rituals  have  been
relatively neglected in the field (but see  Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2009, 2010 as an
important exception). The conflict triggered by rituals of outspokenness differs from
how interpersonal conflict is usually understood. According to Cahn (1997: 61; cited
in Culpeper 2011: 5), interpersonal conflict is “interaction between parties expressing
opposing  interests”;  however,  rituals  of  outspokenness  do  not  represent  a  dyadic
interpersonal  conflict,  but  rather  a  trifold conflict  between the wrongdoer and the
victim, the wrongdoer and the outspoken person, and the wrongdoer and the broader
community  the  outspoken  person  appeals  to.  Section  3.1  models  this  complex
interpersonal  relationship  (see  Figure  2  below).  Furthermore,  as  rituals  of
outspokenness represent morally loaded actions, their research provides an interesting
case study for language aggression and impoliteness. These rituals embody behaviour
that tends to be perceived as aggression, and they are conflictive because:
 
 they  “attack  […]  positive  identity  values”  (Culpeper  2011:  5)  that  the
committer claims for themselves; and 
 they  usually  manifest  themselves  as  an interruption in  front  of  a  group of
bystanders/side participants-to-be, and so they trigger conflict just as heckling
does (see Kádár 2014).
However, the ritual of outspokenness (re-)enacts normative moral expectations, and
so it is meant to reinforce the “moral order” (Whutnow 1989). As Culpeper (2011: 38)
argues, understandings of genuine impoliteness arise as interactants violate the moral
order, and so it can be argued that ritual acts of aggression such as outspokenness
have an ambiguous relationship with genuine impoliteness, as the intervening people
usually  refer  to  their  acts  as  ‘righteous’ (see  Section  3.2).  Thus,  while  these  acts
involve what conversation analysts define as a ‘rights violation’ (see e.g. Stivers et al.
2011),  and  the  wrongdoer  tends  to  be  angered  by  this  violation,  others  tend  to
appreciate it as this violation makes a contribution to the greater good. In other words,
a  ritual  of  outspokenness  is  usually  interpreted  as  a  ratified  form of  intervention
(Drummond 1989) – which is immoral on the surface due to its violative nature but
open to be reinterpreted as moral – and as such it essentially differs from heckling, for
instance. As Section 3.1 shows, due to this ratified and normative characteristic this
form of aggression tends to be mitigated to some extent. 
Third,  the  study  of  rituals  of  outspokenness  provides  new  insights  into
interactional  research  on  rituals.  In  pragmatics,  interpersonal  ritual  is  usually
approached as recurrent and formalised “action” that encompasses a broad range of
speech  acts  (see  e.g.  Lüger  1983;  Ide  1998;  Alexander  2004);  this  action-based
understanding echoes interactional discourse analytic research that touches on ritual
(see Rampton’s 2009 study on ‘crossing’) as well as sociological ritual research (see
e.g.  Bell  1992:  19).  Yet,  there  is  a  gap  between  the  ways  in  which  ‘action’ is
interpreted in these disciplines. In pragmatics and other interactional disciplines, due
to their focus on language in action, ‘ritual’ is often interpreted in a narrow sense: a
practice is performed as a means to generate some response as ends.6 In sociological
6. This is not to mean that pragmatic studies on ritual oversimplify this phenomenon. For 
example, Ide (1998) illustrates in an insightful way that a ritual apology in Japanese can have 
many interpretations, i.e. a certain means can have several ends. 
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theory, on the other hand, ‘ritual action’ is understood more broadly; Goffman  (1967:
185)  states  that  “[b]y  the  term  action I  mean  activities  that  are  consequential,
problematic,  and undertaken for  what  is  felt  to  be  their  own sake”.  Furthermore,
sociologists often use ‘ritual action’ in reference to  reactive forms of behaviour. For
example, Collins (2004: 110) notes that certain types of ritual are reactions by their
nature: “[i]n the Durkheimian model,  violation of solidarity brings the reaction of
righteous anger;  this  results in yet another highly ritualised interaction,  a ritual of
punishment.”  The  present  study  aims  to  consolidate  this  interdisciplinary  gap,  by
adopting  the  broad  interpretation  of  ritual  action  with  the  aim  to  examine  the
phenomenon  of  reactive  ritual  within  the  boundaries  of  language  use.  Rituals  of
outspokenness,  which  come  into  existence  via  the  stimuli  of  public  abuse,  are
examples  par  excellence  for  a  reactive  ritual  action.  We  argue  that  there  is  no
significant typological difference between reactive and other rituals, in that reactive
rituals are normative and expected like any other ritual. In order to illustrate this point,
in Section 3.2 we examine the relationship between context and ritual reaction, and
show that there are certain situations that trigger a straightforward ritual response.
That is,  there are conventional expectances as regards the occurrence of rituals  of
outspokenness; we illustrate this point by examining retrospective comments of those
who perform or fail to perform these rituals.
2. Data
As  Kádár  (2013)  argued  in  a  recent  publication,  it  is  difficult  to  find  data  that
represents ritual abuse in interaction, and this problem also applies to the ritual of
outspokenness, in particular its one-off out-group type studied in this paper. As abuse
that triggers a ritual response(s) is a behavioural anomaly from a normative point of
view, it is difficult for the analyst to anticipate and record such events, even though
there are a number of accidental video recordings (on video sharing websites) and
fictional data  in films that  represent  such events.  There is,  however,  a US hidden
camera  show,  Primetime:  What  Would  You  Do? (henceforth  WWYD),7 which  is
dedicated to this form of behaviour, and which thus serves as the main source of data
for this paper.8
WWYD, hosted by the reporter  John Quiñones,  premiered on the ABC television
network in the United States in 2008. The theme behind the show is that actors act out
scenes  in  which  some type  of  conflict  or  illegal  activity  occurs;  there  are  hidden
cameras that record the event, and the focus is on whether bystanders intervene, if
yes, how, and if no, why. Most of the scenes take place in orderly urban settings, in
which  the  conflictive/illegal  activity  is  even  more  salient.  The  show has  a  news
feature, i.e. in follow-up interviews Quiñones queries those who intervene and others
who  do  not,  and  so  the  episodes  provide  information  on  the  language  users’
reflections on their own behaviours. The scenes feature bystanders’ attitudes towards
abuse in racial, gender, ethics, sexuality, and disability contexts, as well as in a range
of surprising/upsetting scenes, such as when a mother and a child cannot afford to buy
a Christmas tree. In the present research we focus on the former cases, by studying 21
scenes of abuse depicted in WWYD, which include altogether 117 video recordings of
2-3  minutes  in  length  (21,170  words  of  transcript,  excluding  annotations  of  non-
7. See: <http://abc.go.com/shows/what-would-you-do>
8. It is pertinent to note that WWYD is not the first of such shows – in a sense it can be 
regarded as ‘inheritor’ of the British series Candid Camera and its later versions in different 
countries. However, a unique feature of WWYD, as far as we are aware, is that it focuses on 
social problems and abuse in particular.  
5
verbal actions). It is necessary to note that the way in which we transcribed the data
reflects our predominantly interactional interest in the dynamics of ritual as a reactive
form of behaviour; thus, we focus on ritual on an utterance level in a turn-by-turn
way,  instead of  examining the conversational  analytic  features of  interactions (for
micro-level interactional analysis of rituals see Kádár 2013). Also note that in order to
facilitate reading of the examples presented, in each extract we add an arrow to the
line in which the ritual of outspokenness takes place/begins to unfold. 
In  105 of  the  117 respondent  recordings  the  bystander  intervenes  in  some
form, that is, the rate of intervention is 89.7% (see Section 1).9 We do not intend to
regard this rate by itself as of evidence value: intervention rate may be different in
‘real-life’ situations, considering that the abusive scenes in WWYD were designed to
trigger the bystanders’ notice and intervention, whilst non-predesigned forms of real-
life  public  abuse  may  as  well  go  unnoticed. Without  exception  in  our  data,  the
predesigned abusive events take place in the proximity of a few but not too many
bystanders. This arrangement seems to us to ensure that the bystanders gain a proper
understanding of what is going on, and to prevent what social psychologists often
describe  as  the  ‘Kitty  Genovese  effect’ (Manning  et  al.  2007),  in  reference  to  a
famous murder case in New York City when a woman was killed and raped, and the
neighbours failed even to call the police in time, supposedly because they expected
others to do something. In WWYD, as there are not many others around to intervene
on  the  individual’s  behalf,  there  is  a  pressure  on  the  individual  to  intervene.
Furthermore, we have no means to look into the production of the interviews behind
the scenes, and there is a possibility that the series simply does not feature some of the
intervention  and  non-intervention  cases. Nevertheless,  this  is  still  a  notably  high
frequency  rate,  considering  that  the  reports  aim  to  feature  the  failure  of  non-
intervention  as  much  as  intervention,  and  that  this  figure  represents  an  overall
frequency rate in the various setting types. Thus, it is safe to argue that intervention
has a normative nature when it comes to public abuse, and Section 3.2 draws upon
further evidence to support this claim.
An advantage of studying WWYD is that it is a specific type of reality show: a docu-
drama or a fly on the wall documentary made with the help of secret cameras (see
more  in  Lorenzo-Dus  and  Garcés-Conejos  Blitvich  2013).  Because  of  this,  the
bystanders are unaware that they were being observed, which is important for the
analyst,  considering that  not  performing rituals  of  outspokenness occasions  shame
(see Section 3.2). In other words, anticipation triggered by “double articulation”, i.e.
“a  communicative  interaction  between those  participating in  discussion,  interview,
game show or whatever, and, at the same time, is designed to be heard by absent
audiences” (see Scannell 1991:1, cited in  Lorenzo-Dus and Garcés-Conejos Blitvich
2013:32) – does not influence the interactional behaviour of the bystanders. 
In order to support the findings, along with the WWYD data we also examined
17 North American anti-bullying promotional films, such as “Anti-Bullying – Kill
The Silence”,10 in which bystander behaviour is featured. These films confirmed our
findings about the shame value triggered by failure to intervene in settings of abuse:
9. The actual rate might be slightly different from this figure, as there are some side 
participants whose intervention does not qualify as a ritual of outspokenness (see example 
10). However, there are also some bystanders who failed to intervene but made some passive 
attempts to align with the victim, e.g. looking round for help. However, as the number of 
participants on these sides largely coincide (4 to 5), the roughly 90% intervention rate seems 
to be a reliable figure. 
10. See: < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJxWAYEcl_s>
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several of these promotional films depict passive bystanders who failed to help and
who regret this failure in retrospect. We also made use of 25 interviews that the first
author conducted in Hungary (Kádár 2013). Whilst most of these interviews concern
recurrent in-group verbal abuse and rituals of outspokenness in such situations, they
confirm what WWYD shows about the ‘moral obligation’ of bystanders to intervene
in the event of an abuse (see Section 3.2). 
3. Analysis
We approach the phenomenon of rituals of outspokenness by focusing on the two
bystander attitudes of intervention and non-intervention in situations of public abuse,
and the footings  that  these attitudes  trigger.  Section 3.1 examines  cases when the
bystander becomes a side participant through performing the ritual of outspokenness.
We first  analyse  outspoken  behaviour,  by  approaching  it  from the  perspective  of
(dis)alignment  (Goffman 1967),  and also  by looking into  types  of  ‘conversational
argumentation’ (Van  Dijk  1997)  applied  in  these  ritual  acts.  On  the  basis  of  the
(dis)affiliative attitudes of the interveners, we elaborate an interpersonal interactional
model  of  rituals  of  outspokenness.  In  section  3.2  we  look  into  the  reactive  and
normative  nature  of  rituals  of  outspokenness:  we  examine  the  ‘moral  obligation’
(Gorsuch and Ortberg 1983) of bystanders to intervene triggered by acts of abuse, by
focusing on the perceptions of those who fail to intervene, and who were queried by
Quiñones regarding their failure to intervene. 
In this paper we use the terms ‘alignment’ and ‘disalignment’ in the sense in which
they are understood in social psychology, to describe actions that increase/decrease
cohesion between participants of an interaction. We avoid using the terms ‘politeness’
and ‘impoliteness’ because, as Section 3.1 illustrates, although there is an important
interface  between  acts  of  alignment/disalignment  and  politeness/impoliteness,  not
every disaffiliative ritual of outspokenness is impolite. For instance, there are highly
mitigated interventions, which express disalignment from the wrongdoer and trigger
conflict on the one hand – simply because any intervention has a potential to create
conflict and be interpreted as a form of aggression – and which might be evaluated as
‘polite’ by various participants due to their mitigated nature, on the other. Another
important advantage of using alignment and disalignment relates to the scene studied:
since intervention happens in the context of a clash between the wrongdoer and the
victim, those who intervene essentially take sides through acting – or non-acting – i.e.
from an interpersonal perspective these actions, unlike acts of (im)politeness, have no
potential to operate simply within the speaker-hearer dyad. 
3.1. The act of the ritual of outspokenness
The act of being outspoken entails alignment with the victim and disalignment from
the wrongdoer. This attitude manifests itself in the following behavioural patterns in
the data studied:
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Figure 1: Types of ritual outspoken behaviour
Note that there may be no clear border between the categories of overt and covert
conflict,  as covert conflict has a potential to transform into overt conflict and vice
versa, as an interaction unfolds, and so overt and covert should be understood as two
ends  of  a  scale.  The  behavioural  patterns  above  have  been  identified  in  the  data
studied  as  we  realised  that  intervention  is  not  a  homogenous  phenomenon,  and
consequently one should avoid using it as an umbrella term.11 
In what follows, let us illustrate how these behavioural types operate. The act
of a ritual of outspokenness can take place in the form of overt conflict, i.e. when the
outspoken person directly challenges the wrongdoer. Example (1) represents such an
overt conflict, as the outspoken customer overtly challenges the server, by uttering
“Sorry, but you are just  being rude”.  Such overt conflict  can take place either via
direct disalignment, as in (1), or in a more indirect form which we define as ‘mock
alignment’.  Mock  alignment  covers  cases  when  the  outspoken  person  pretends
alignment with the wrongdoer in a form that makes it clear that the given act is in fact
disalignment from the wrongdoer,12 and it is illustrated by the following example:
(2)
Dog left inside a hot car
A dog has been left in the back seat of car on a very hot day and barks loudly
as people pass by. It is illegal to leave a pet in a car in New Jersey.
1. Female: It’s just so hot in there. […] But, the police are coming right 
now. 
2. Dog owner: You called the cops? How is any of that your concern? 
3. Female: The dog is in there panting and could die. That’s our concern. 
Not you.
In line 1 a female bystander, who seems to be willing to challenge the dog owner,
addresses the wrongdoer by ‘describing’ the actual situation; note that she does not
say anything directly about the dog’s owner, but in fact she simply starts with the
matter of fact statement about the condition in the car, in a non-aggressive tone of
voice. This comment could even be interpreted as a friendly proposal to resolve the
dog’s situation, and in fact this is what a previous bystander in the same report of
WWYD is  doing:  she  attempts  to  rescue  the  dog simply by drawing the owner’s
11. Tendency-wise a difference can be observed between these patterns: amongst the 117 
interactions studied, in 98 the intervening person applies a pattern of overt conflict to 
intervene.
12. On such mock acts see Culpeper’s (1996) seminal study.
1) overt conflict a) direct disalignment from the wrongdoer(s) and indirect 
alignment with the victim(s) 
b) direct disalignment from the wrongdoer(s) and direct 
alignment with the victim(s)
c) mock alignment with the wrongdoer(s) and (in)direct 
alignment with the victim(s)
2) covert conflict alignment with the victim and indirect disalignment from the 
wrongdoer
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attention to the fact that it’s hot inside the car in a friendly and joking tone – in other
words, she tries to align with the owner in order to resolve the situation. However, this
is not what happens here, as the intervening person continues with a ‘casual’ remark
“But, the police are coming right now”, which is clearly menacing. Note, however,
that even this menacing remark is made in an indirect way:  the intervening person
does not directly invoke New Jersey law about keeping pets in hot cars, and although
she indicates that someone has called the police, implying that such action is against
the law, she hides her agency by saying “the police are coming” (instead of “I’ve
called the police”).
In sum, the intervention begins as a fake or mock alignment attempt, which 
transforms into a clear expression of disalignment from the wrongdoer.
Our data shows that mock alignment can occasionally take place in a jocular
form (see Haugh 2010), as in example (3):
(3)
Abusive boyfriend 
A couple is arguing in the park. Bystanders overhear the argument but seem 
conflicted over intervention. An elderly female bystander decides to intervene.
1. Boyfriend: Stop crying. Shut up! 
 2. Elderly female: Hey buddy! Cool it!
3. Boyfriend: Ma’am, can you just let us do our own thing? It’s my 
girlfriend. Can you just leave us alone?
4. Elderly female: No. That’s now how you treat someone. How about I 
call the cops?
Here the intervener, an elderly woman, addresses the abusive person by uttering “Hey
buddy! Cool it!”. Calling the wrongdoer ‘buddy’ in an accentuated and ironic tone is
clearly conflictive, as this idiomatic expression conveys the opposite of what it means
literally: the person it is addressed to is not a friend by any means. Whilst ‘buddy’ is
not necessarily used to belittle, it is pragmatically appropriate to signal disagreement
or opposition, and this meaning is even stronger in this interaction due to the emotive
context and also to the age gap between the wrongdoer and the intervening person. 
In cases of ‘overt  conflict’,  the outspoken person may or may not  directly
align with the victim. In example (1), for instance, the outspoken person does not
directly address the lesbian couple. In some other cases, however, disalignment from




A couple is arguing in the park. Bystanders overhear the argument but seem 
conflicted over intervention. A young female, who is with a couple of friends, 
decides to intervene.
1. Boyfriend: Natalie sit down and listen to me. [pushes Natalie]
2. Young female: I could see you from up there. You do not push a 
woman out in public. That is complete bullshit. 
3. Young female: [turning to Natalie] Seriously, do you need a ride home?
4. Boyfriend: Natalie, sit down. This is my girlfriend. 
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5. Young female: Wait. Who are you talking to? She is not a dog. You are 
just a little punk-ass kid and getting on my last nerve. 
After clashing with the abusive person, the intervener turns to the victim, offering “a
ride  home”.  This  affiliative  attempt  seems  to  boost  the  disalignment  from  the
wrongdoer – which takes place in the form of the expletives ‘bullshit’ (to refer to the
situation) and ‘punk-ass kid’ (a person reference term) in addressing the abuser – as
claiming commonality with the victim conveys a clear message.13 
In  fact,  alignment  situated  in  intervention  has  a  clear  disaffiliative  metamessage
(Jaworski 1993), and an intervention can take a purely affiliative form, i.e. without an
overt challenge taking place. We refer to such cases as ‘covert conflict’ (see Figure 1)
because  these  acts  –  which  are  ritualistic  performances  that  symbolise  the
wrongdoer’s inappropriate behaviour – are also conflictive.  Example (5), which is
from the same episode as example (4), representing the abuse of a young woman
Natalie by her ‘boyfriend’ – illustrates the operation of such covert clashes:
(5)
Abusive boyfriend 
A couple is arguing in the park. Bystanders overhear the argument but seem
conflicted over intervention. An elderly female bystander decides to step in.
 
1. Boyfriend: You are a whore that is useless. There is no point in being 
with you anymore. You are freaking useless. Go! 
2. Elderly female: [wraps her arm around Natalie, looks disapprovingly at
the boyfriend, and escorts her away from the abusive boyfriend.]
This time an elderly female intervenes as the same staged abusive conversation takes
place between the couple as in example (4) above. She does not utter anything, but
simply steps in and escorts Natalie away from the abusive boyfriend, while her facial
expression  signals  disapproval.14 Whilst  no  overt  challenge  takes  place  here,  this
silence  can  be  described  as  a  meaningful  one  (Jaworski  1993),  as  it  expresses
disalignment  from  the  wrongdoer.  Also,  the  body  language  of  the  intervener
(wrapping her arm around Natalie) is a common sign of protective alignment (see
Kinsbourne 2006).
 So far we have argued that the ritual of outspokenness can manifest itself as overt and
covert conflict, and in different behavioural patterns. In addition to this, as our data
indicates,  there  is  also  a  significant  contextual  variation  in  the  conversational
argumentative  patterns  of  these  acts.  In  general,  argumentation  patterns  of
intervention include: 
1. moral judgements of the wrongdoer’s behaviour.
This is what the extracts that have been studied so far represent in the contexts of
overt  conflict  (see  examples  1–4)  and  covert  conflict  (example  5).  Other
argumentation patterns in the context of intervention are: 
13. See Pan (2013) on pragmatics acts of commonality.
14. We intentionally use a non-verbal case here to describe covert disallignment: as example 
(5) illustrates, the act of disallignment can be as indirect as the elderly female’s behaviour 
here, who manages to disalign from the wrongdoer without uttering a word.
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2. highly  mitigated  verbal  utterances  in  the  case  of  covert  conflict,  i.e.
interventions in which, unlike in the cases studied above, the outspoken person
attempts  to  tone  down  the  negative  impact  of  the  intervention  on  the
wrongdoer, and 
3. divine appeals  – in  the case of  overt  conflict  – i.e.  cases  when instead of
directly  criticising  the  wrongdoer  the  outspoken  person  appeals  to  the
wrongdoer’s morality by invoking God.15 
It  is  pertinent  to  note about  pattern no.  2 that  intervention in general  tends  to  be
mitigated to  some extent,  as  our  data  show, supposedly because  this  is  an  act  of
aggression that aims to reconstruct the normative order. However, when the context
affords this, conflict can become so highly mitigated that it becomes covert, as the
following examples illustrate:
(6)
Gay athlete comes out to his friends 
Friends are at a busy shopping centre and a gay athlete tells his buddies that 
he is gay. His friends start to tease him and say homophobic slurs. A female 
overhears the teasing and steps in immediately and says the friends should not
tease the gay person and they should not be so hard on him. Line 1 below 
takes place after the ‘friends’ of the gay athlete have already started to 
comprehend the situation, and the athlete makes the actual coming out. 
1.Gay Athlete: I have something to tell you guys.
2. Friend: Stop playing bro! You are gay? G-A-Y? [starts laughing and 
backs away from gay athlete]
3. Gay Athlete: Yes. 
4. Friend: You really don’t like females? You don’t like girls? You know 
what we call males that like men? 
5. Young female: Ya’ll wrong. I heard the conversation. Ya’ll ain’t right. 
That’s your friend? 
6. Friend: That was my friend. 
7. Young female: What do you mean was? That shouldn’t stop you guys 
from being friends. 
[…]
In example (6), the young female who intervenes not only reminds the wrongdoer
about  the  improperness  of  the  act,  but  also  attempts  to  mediate  between  the
wrongdoer  and  the  gay  athlete.  Whilst  this  intervention,  as  many  other  types  of
intervention, is conflictive, and the female first disaligns from the wrongdoer (“Ya’ll
wrong.  […]  Ya’ll  ain’t  right”),  as  the  interaction  unfolds,  in  line  5  the  woman
mitigates  the previous intervention.  The utterance “What  do you mean  was? That
shouldn’t stop you guys from being friends” is open to be interpreted as an indirect
‘offer’ to transform disalignment into alignment both between 1) the intervener and
the wrongdoers, and 2) the wrongdoers and the victim; addressing the wrongdoer as
one of the “guys” expresses familiarity (see Heyd 2010). One can observe a similar
interpersonal dynamics in example (7):
15. In 78 out of the 117 interactions the first pattern is followed, whilst highly mitigated 
utterances occur in 27 cases and divine appeals in 12 cases. 
11
(7)
Mother forces her daughter to tan
Mother and daughter argue over getting a tan. The mother insults daughter 
saying she looks too pasty and white, and the daughter says she does not want
to get cancer. 
 
1. Mother: You’re gonna look so much better with a tan. You do not look 
healthy. You are gonna do it whether you want to or not. Get in the 
booth right now. 
2. Daughter: I don’t want to. You know I don’t tan. 
3. Mother: Yea. But look at you! [pause] You are pasty white. Listen 
honey we are here for a reason. Look at those girls. They look great. 
4. Young female: Thanks. But I still think she looks pretty. […] I think 
she rocks it.
In this interaction the young female aligns with the victim in a clearly mitigated way –
hence  decreasing  the  indirect  disaffiliative  message  that  this  alignment  attempt
triggers  –  as  she  says  thank you to  the  mother  (which  is  both  a  mitigator  and a
discourse  marker  of  disagreement).  Note  that  the  dynamics  of  the  interaction
facilitates  this  mediation  attempt:  the  young female  is  directly  referred  to  by  the
mother – in most cases in the data studied bystanders are not acknowledged until they
intervene – and it seems as though, for the young female, this reference offers an
indirect invitation to intervene.
As  regards  the  third  argumentative  pattern,  in  some  overt  conflicts  the
outspoken person, instead of criticising the wrongdoer’s behaviour, invokes God into
their rationale for standing up, as the following example illustrates:
(8)
Gay parents verbally abused
This is the same setting as the one featured in example (1): a server harasses 
a lesbian couple.
1. Server: Are you guys a couple? And you are raising kids like that? 
Well, they need dads. I am not the one in public kissing all over a 
woman in front of my kids. That’s not … I actually have morals and 
standards. 
2. Young male: You believe in Jesus?
3. Server: Do I? What are you trying to tell me?
4. Young male: Don’t judge. That simple. I’ll never judge you and I try 
not to judge other people.
Whilst this type of intervention is an overt form of behaviour (unlike e.g. example 6),
due to its  appealing characteristic it  seems to be less conflictive (at  least  from an
analytic  point  of  view)  than  interventions  which  openly  criticise  the  wrongdoer’s
behaviour (see the first  category),  in the form of statements such as “You are the
worst…”,  “I can’t believe you…”, and so on. 
This list of argumentation patterns is not exclusive, i.e. it only reflects the ones
we could observe in the WWYD data. The choice of a given pattern seems to be
influenced not  only  by  dyadic  contextual  factors,  such as  the  physical  and social
power relationships involved, but also by the number and attitude of bystanders. As
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ritual intervention evokes normative social values as a performance, it operates as a
direct or indirect appeal to a broader alleged or real audience. The word appeal should
be  emphasised  here  for  the  following  reason.  The  competition  to  align  with
bystanders  is  present  in  any  conflict  talk;  as  Goffman  (1967:25)  puts  it,  “[i]n
aggressive  interchanges  the  winner  not  only  succeeds  in  introducing  information
favourable  to  himself  and  unfavourable  to  others,  but  also  demonstrates  that  as
interactant  he  can  handle  himself  better  than  his  adversaries.”  However,  what
Goffman labels as ‘demonstration’ does not manifest itself in every conflict talk, as an
appeal to support:  for example,  in certain conflict  settings there is  no audience to
appeal to. The ritual of outspokenness is an example par excellence for cases when
language aggression triggers appeal. The appellative nature of the rituals is illustrated
by the fact that in some cases, when the intervening person is not alone, bystanders
who are not familiar with the intervener and their group also join the conversation to
support the outspoken person. Thus, the interaction between the outspoken person and
the wrongdoer is not a dyadic one (see also Section 1): instead, it should be captured
as  a  potential  ‘competition’ between  the  outspoken  person  and  the  wrongdoer  to
become alignd with the bystanders/side participants-to-be. In order to show this point,
let us revisit examples (1) and (2):
(1) (reproduced)
Lesbian parents verbally abused  
1. Server: You’re gay and you have kids? It’s bad enough that you are 
lesbians but that they don’t have a father. [pause] I think that is kind of 
bad. You don’t feel uncomfortable – people watching you? Isn’t it bad 
for the kids? I think it’s terrible!
2. [Lesbian couple does not answer and looks very embarrassed.]
3. Young male: Sorry, but you are just being rude. It’s completely 
inappropriate when someone comes into a restaurant to have breakfast 
with their family that you question their life choices.
4. Server: I just think I am entitled to my own opinion. 
5. Young male: You are entitled to your opinion but this is not the place to
voice your opinion.
6. Server: Is it just me that’s upset? [looks to different directions in the 
restaurant]
In  line  6,  after  being  challenged,  the  server  makes  a  (counter-)appeal  to  the
bystanders’ morality, in order to validate her action. This is not a symbolic attempt, as
shown by the data: as the server makes this appeal in several versions of the same
scene, in one interaction a bystander, in response, gives an overt ‘thumbs-up’ to the
server. Yet, the affiliative attempts of the outspoken person and the wrongdoer are not
on a par, in that any intervention is an implicit invitation to bystanders to join as
supporters,  whilst  the  wrongdoer  has  to  recruit  supporters  explicitly,  as  in  (1).
Accordingly, as the data show, rituals of outspokenness tend to attract bystanders to
turn into side participants without any explicit invitation,  as shown in excerpt (2),
which is reproduced below:
(2) (reproduced)





 1. Female: It’ just so hot in there. […] But, the police are coming right 
now. 
2. Dog owner: You called the cops? How is any of that your concern? 
3. Female: The dog is in there panting and could die. That’s our concern. 
Not you.
4. Dog owner: It’s just a dog. 
 5. Male: I have pets at home that I consider my family. 
In  general,  rituals  encourage  participation  due  to  their  mimetic  nature;  as  Collins
(2004) demonstrates, rituals operate in “chains”, i.e. a ritual action is open to trigger a
number of similar actions. Yet, participation is particularly salient in the data studied,
supposedly because clearly immoral acts like leaving a dog inside a hot car generate a
clear  common  ground  (e.g.  empathy)  between  the  outspoken  person  and  other
bystanders. 
Figure 2 illustrates the interpersonal operation of the ritual of outspokenness
(as well as silence and physical action, as in example 5):
Figure 2: The interpersonal setting of conflicts of outspokenness
The arrows represent  the direction of  conflict:  the outspoken person enters  into a
conflict with the wrongdoer, and the wrongdoer, in principle, enters into a conflict
with the victim, although as the broken arrow pointing towards the outspoken person
illustrates, they can counter-challenge the outspoken person as well. The dashed lines
represent alignment attempts: the outspoken person not only aligns, either directly or
indirectly, with the victim, but also with bystanders, by animating (claimed or real)
social values; the same can be done by the wrongdoer’s counter-appeal, except that
this counter-appeal needs to be an overt one, as in example (1). 
Note that the model proposed here is set into operation only if it is clear that
the victim has been abused, and the bystanders are able to empathise/form a common
ground with them. If, for example, an improper action of A against B takes place after
a  previous  improper  action  committed  by B against  A,  it  is  less  likely  to  trigger
intervention, as example (9) illustrates:
(9)
Clumsy teen server drops food on floor
Scene no. 1:
A teen server drops food on the floor, puts it back on the plate and serves it to 
a customer. Many customers who see this happening intervene, telling the teen
not to serve the dropped food. 
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1. Teen: Here you go. [serving a plate of food after he dropped it on the 
floor]
2. Customer 1: Hey didn’t you just drop that? And you gonna serve that 
to them?
3. Teen: Our floor is clean.
4. Customer 2: You can’t serve this to someone. 
Scene no. 2:
This time a customer berates the teen server upon arrival to the restaurant. 
The server drops this customer’s food on the floor but serves it anyway. Almost
no customers step in to say the food has touched the floor. 
1. Mean Customer: Hey Carrot Top! You are just a server. Who cares how
we treat him.
[makes an order; the server takes it, then drops the food, puts it back on
the plate and serves it to the customer]
2. Other customers: [silence]
Follow-up interviews:
Customer 2 non-intervener: Yes, I saw the server drop the food on the floor 
and serve it. Why should I start a commotion that’s not relevant to my well-
being. 
Customer 3 non-intervener: Let him eat the dirty food. He is a dirty man. 
In the first scene, customers intervene because the improper act clearly violates their
moral order. However, the same act is evaluated differently in the second scene, due
to the customer’s previous abusive behaviour. It can be argued that in a sense that in
this  latter  scene  being  silent operates  in  an  equally  disaffiliative  way  with  being
outspoken in other contexts:  the bystanders obviously take the server’s side,  as is
made clear by Customer 3’s comment in the follow-up interview, and they express
disalignment from the abusive person by failing to provide help for him.
3.2. Failure to perform the ritual
The  motivations  for  intervening  through  rituals  of  outspokenness  seem  to  be
straightforward.  In  the  follow-up  interviews  conducted  by  Quiñones,  many  side
participants  referred  to  some  general  moral  reasons,  such  as  “human  decency”,
“fairness” and “civility”, as motivators to intervene. Some other participants referred
to empathy for the victim, evoked by their personal histories. For example, a female
intervener who helped the couple in the scene featured in example (1) said that she
intervened because she knows what it is like to be stigmatised for being different. 
The motivations for failing to perform the ritual of outspokenness are more
complex.  First,  whilst  in  many  scenes  depicted  in  WWYD  it  is  relatively
straightforward for many bystanders to take sides (see example 9), there are certain
situations which are more ambiguous from a normative moral perspective. Once such
an ambiguity occurs, bystanders are likely to find it difficult to intervene, even if they





In a crowded restaurant a young pregnant woman is discussing with her 
friend whether or not to tell her boyfriend he is not the father of the child. The 
unsuspecting boyfriend arrives, and the woman lies, saying that she is 
pregnant with his child. After the father excuses himself from the table to call 
his parents and tell them the good news, some people sitting nearby intervene 
and non-aggressively advise the woman to come out with the truth. However, 
nobody actually intervenes when the boyfriend is there, by telling him that he 
is the victim of a lie. 
1. Pregnant woman [to her friend]: I have thought about it and I have no 
other option. John is the better option for the father. I can’t tell him that
it’s not his baby. It’s really hard. I don’t know what to do. [crying]
2. Customer 1: You know what? You seriously need to tell the truth to the
guy. 
3. Customer 2: After the baby is born you should have a DNA test. 
4. Pregnant Woman: So, I shouldn’t say anything to him?
5. Customer 2: No. Not yet. 
6. Customer 1: Okay, I agree with that.
Follow-up interview
Customer 3: It’s a personal matter. 
The fact that ‘appropriate’ behaviour is co-constructed by Customer 1 and 2 indicates
that  this  is  a  complex  situation  from  a  moral  perspective,  as  there  is  no  clear
wrongdoer–victim  relationship,  which  consequently  only  allows  what  Makri-
Tsilipakou (1994) defines as “affiliative intervention”. Also, as follow-up interviews
make clear, bystanders such as Customer 3 found it morally problematic to make a
fully-fledged intervention by informing the boyfriend that  he is  a  victim of  a  lie,
despite clearly empathising with him.
Secondly, unlike outspoken side participants who intervene, the (minority of)
bystanders who fail to help the victim in scenes that clearly call for intervention refer
to some lofty reasons for this failure. Interestingly, whilst there are two bystanders in
our data who clearly admit unwillingness or inability to intervene (e.g. “I personally
thought it was none of my business”), the other non-interveners give morally loaded
explanations for not helping the victim. Example (11) illustrates this phenomenon:
(11)
Sikh refused job at restaurant
Manager tells a Sikh man that he cannot wear his turban while at work, as he 
looks threatening. Whilst a number of customers help the Sikh, there are some 
others who do not; their responses are shown in the follow-up interview 
section. 
1. Manager: Obviously you can’t wear the head garb.
2. Sikh: What do you mean I can’t wear the head garb?
3. Manager: I can’t have you wear that. It’s just part of our policy here 
that everyone is non-denominational.
4. Sikh: You want me to take off the turban?
[…]
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5. Manager: Look. I am going to be honest with you. I can’t hire you 
looking the way you look.
6. Sikh: Looking the way I look?
7. Manager: It’s threatening. 
Follow-up interviews
Customer 1 non-intervener: The bottom line is if there is a dress code and you 
want the job – jobs are hard to get – you follow the dress code. That’s how I 
feel. If I really wanted the job I’d take the turban off. 
Customer 2 non-intervener: I think in America you should dress and behave as
an American. Fit in with the society. I know it’s not politically correct in the 
United States and everybody wants to be more open. I am open myself, but 
I’m open also to change my behaviour. 
Customer 3 non-intervener: That guy was out of line. He was clearly 
discriminating against the guy. No. How can you do it? I’m embarrassed that I 
did not jump up.
Though  Customer  3  simply  admits  that  he  feels  embarrassed  for  failing  to  help,
Customer  1  and  Customer  2  provide  moral  grounds  for  their  behaviour.  The
researcher has no means to peep into the interactants’ minds, and sometimes people
simply can be proud of not helping a victim (e.g. when someone dislikes the victim).
However, the recurrence of moral argumentation in the accounts of those who failed
to live up to socially normative expectations – and who are made aware of this failure,
and the fact that they are being watched, as Quiñones confronts them in the follow-up
interview  –  suggests  that  usually  these  narratives  aim  to  reconstruct  bystander
identities  (see  Freeman  2001).  By  reconstruction  we  mean  that,  as  identity  is
(co-)constructed in interaction, in such accounts the narrators – who seem to be aware
of the fact that they were doing something improper – attempt to form a positive
image of themselves towards others. What further indicates the reconstructive nature
of these accounts is that practically all of those who did not step in to help the victim
and did not admit defeat as Customer 3 above, unlike the interveners refused to show
their  face  on  camera,  even  if  they  agreed  to  comment  on  their  behaviour.  Their
attempt to interactionally reconstruct their identities points to the argument made in
Section 1: settings of abuse impose a moral obligation on bystanders to intervene.
In  relation  to  the  moral  obligation,  it  is  pertinent  here  to  refer  to  an
experiment,  which Kádár (2013:  171–3) previously conducted,  by interviewing 14
people who observed and experienced abusive practices within certain groups and
failed to help the victim, and who were later made aware of their failure; in addition,
Kádár in the same experiment examined 21 anecdotal cases retold by people who
failed to intervene in an abuse incident. Whilst the abuse in such cases differed from
the one studied in this  paper,  the moral implication is  fairly similar to that in the
WWYD data. As the experiment made clear, those who failed to stand up for others
tended  to  describe  these  events  by  using  euphemistic  labels,  and  in  general  they
downgraded the impact  of the happenings  on the victim.  As Kádár  (2013: 172-3)
argues:
Such evaluations […] seem to be motivated by the awareness and anticipation
that  […]  being  a  passive  onlooker  is  problematic  if  an  event  is  morally
objected to by the public. That is, people in retrospect may re-evaluate their
historically situated understanding of the given act.
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4. Discussion: Findings and future research
The present paper has filled an important knowledge gap in the field, by examining an
understudied form of ritual behaviour, hence contributing to pragmatics and research
on  interpersonal  rituals.  We  have  argued  that  rituals  of  outspokenness  manifest
themselves in various forms of (dis)affiliative behaviour as overt and covert conflicts,
and  through  a  number  of  conversational  argumentative  patterns.  Along  with
modelling the interpersonal operation of this phenomenon, we have argued that there
is a moral obligation triggered by settings of abuse (although such obligations are, of
course, highly context dependent). This obligation is noteworthy from the perspective
of the ritual researcher, as it indicates that there are certain situations that generate a
straightforward ritual response. In such settings ritual reaction is an expected action,
whilst non-acting by itself is also interpreted as an improper ‘passive action’.  The
moral  obligation,  and  the  evaluations  it  triggers,  are  also  relevant  to  research  on
(im)politeness  and  aggression,  as  Section  1  argued:  the  rightful  aggression  of
interveners tends to be evaluated positively, and the passive and often non-aggressive
behaviour  is  usually  perceived  negatively.  This  points  to  a  major  gap  between
ritualised aggression (see Bax 2002), which (re-)enacts normative social values, and
more ad hoc forms of aggression, which tend to be perceived as impolite, rude, and so
on.  As  ritualised  aggression  restores  (or  represents)  the  normative  beliefs  of  the
performer(s) – and that of most of the observer(s) – it is aggressive in the sense that it
triggers conflict in more or less indirect ways.16 However, due to its normative nature
a  ritual  of  outspokenness  is  not  necessarily  perceived  as  destructive  or  even
aggressive by the performer and the bystanders/side participants,  i.e.  unlike many
other forms of language aggression it is not “directed towards the goal of harming and
injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment” (Baron and
Richardson 1994, cited in Culpeper 2011: 20).
It is pertinent to note that the present research represents a stage in a cross-cultural
research project conducted by Kádár (2015, forthcoming),  which aims to compare
ritual practices across cultures. Rituals of outspokenness as described by the present
paper seem to be culture-specific. We have examined these rituals by using North
American  data,  and  previous  research  suggests  that  there  is  considerable  cultural
variation  when  it  comes  to  standing  up  for  a  victim  (e.g.  Menesini  et  al.  1998;
Kanetsuna et al. 1996).17 In certain cultures, such as the Japanese, this act seems to be
less expected to take place than in other cultures, although expectations in this respect
seem to be a matter of degree,  rather than clear-cut cross-cultural  differences. For
example, as Donahue (1998: 18) argues, it is relatively irregular in Japan, compared to
Western cultures (and North America, in particular), to stand up for victims of abuse,
in  particular  if  the  victim  is  not  closely  related  to  someone.  Thus,  ‘morality’ as
featured in this paper represents a supposedly Judeo-Christian understanding of moral
attitude,18 and this entails that rituals of outspokenness are more prevalent in cultures
in which “Good Samaritan” behaviour is regarded as normative than in others (see
Tang et al. 2008). 
16. A different degree of indirectness, by itself, does not distinguish ritualised aggression 
from other types of aggression, which can also be more and less indirect.
17. As Archer’s (1999) insightful study indicates, there is also some sub-cultural variation in 
this respect, i.e. even in cultures in which being outspoken is valued there are contexts (such 
as in the military), which discourage such ritual practices.
18. See Haugh and Kádár (2014, forthcoming) on the culture specificity of morality in terms 
of pragmatic behaviour.
18
It  is  a  task  for  future  research  to  clarify  cross-cultural  overlaps  and  differences
between forms of ritualised aggression that restore the normative order, by looking
into culturally-specific moral expectations. The model offered in this  paper, which
approaches  ritual  practices  from the  perspective  of  their  relational  operation,  can
provide a starting point for such inquiries. 
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